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Abstract
What are the effects of deliberation about political issues? This essay reports the results
of a kind of Deliberation Day, involving sixty-three citizens in Colorado. Groups from Boulder, a
predominantly liberal city, met and discussed global warming, affirmative action, and civil
unions for same-sex couples; groups from Colorado Springs, a predominately conservative city,
met to discuss the same issues. The major effect of deliberation was to make group members
more extreme than they were when they started to talk. Liberals became more liberal on all three
issues; conservatives became more conservative. As a result, the division between the citizens of
Boulder and the citizens of Colorado Springs were significantly increased as a result of
intragroup deliberation. Deliberation also increased consensus, and dampened diversity, within
the groups. Implications are explored for the uses and structure of deliberation in general.

The American constitutional system aspires to be a deliberative democracy—one that
combines accountability with a high degree of reflection and reason-giving.1 Inspired by the
deliberative ideal, many people have explored the foundations of political deliberation and its
implications for political reform.2 Indeed, Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin have gone so far
as to suggest a new national holiday, Deliberation Day, on which citizens would deliberate about
national issues, in a manner intended to promote political learning and more reasonable
judgments.3 But what is likely to happen on Deliberation Day?
For a Deliberation Day to realize its promise, a reasonable variety of views must be
expressed and discussed. Without exposure to competing views, citizens will not be able to
engage in a balanced and informed weighing of positions—a prerequisite of deliberation. But
sufficient diversity may be unlikely if people engage in voluntary self-sorting, or if citizens are
sorted in geographical terms, where sheer demographics may mean that most groups consist
largely of like-minded people. To the extent that this is so, groups may well fail to have the
requisite diversity on Deliberation Day. And even if considerable diversity exists, it remains
possible to question the likely effects of deliberation. Perhaps error rather than truth, or
confusion rather than clarity, will ultimately prevail.
To examine those effects, we created an experimental Deliberation Day. On this day,
citizens from two cities in Colorado were assembled into five-person groups and asked to
deliberate on three of the most contested issues of the time: global warming, affirmative action,
and civil unions for same-sex couples. The two cities were Boulder, known to be predominantly
liberal, and Colorado Springs, known to be predominantly conservative. Citizens were asked to
record their views individually and anonymously; to deliberate together and to reach, if possible,
a group decision; and then to record their postdeliberation views individually and anonymously.
What happened on Deliberation Day? The basic answers are simple. First, the groups
from Boulder became even more liberal on all three issues; the groups from Colorado Springs
became even more conservative. Deliberation thus increased extremism. Second, every group
1

See Joseph Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994); Arthur Lupia
and Mathew D. McCubbins, The Democratic Dilemma: Can Citizens Learn What They Need To Know? (1998).
2 See Jürgen Habermas, Between Facts and Norms (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1996) (elaborating deliberative
conception of democracy); Deliberative Democracy (Jon Elster, ed., New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998)
(collecting diverse treatments of deliberative democracy); Amy Gutmann & Dennis Thompson, Democracy and
Disagreement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1996) (defending deliberative democracy and discussing its
preconditions).
3
See Bruce Ackerman and James Fishkin, Deliberation Day (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003).
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showed increased consensus, and decreased diversity, in the attitudes of their members. Many of
the groups showed substantial heterogeneity before they started to deliberate; as a result of a
brief period of discussion, group members showed much more agreement, even in the
anonymous expressions of their private views.

Third, deliberation sharply increased the

differences between the views of the largely liberal citizens of Boulder and the largely
conservative citizens of Colorado Springs. Before deliberation began, there was considerable
overlap between many individuals in the two different cities. After deliberation, the overlap was
much smaller.
The simplest statement of our findings is that deliberation among like-minded people
produced ideological amplification—an amplification of preexisting tendencies, produced by
group discussion. In some forms, ideological amplification has been established in other
experimental settings, as we shall see; but it has not been much explored in the context of
contested political issues. As we shall also see, our experimental design diverges dramatically
from that in related experiments4; and in key ways, our design corresponds more closely to the
real world of social deliberation.
In this essay, we report the results of our Deliberation Day experiment, attempt to explain
those results, and offer some brief remarks on the implications for law and democracy in general.
We suggest that the Colorado experiment has analogies in many domains of democratic life. It
offers a vivid warning about the consequences of the uncritical promotion of deliberation and
suggests the need for careful institutional design of well-functioning democratic processes. Let
us begin with the details of the study.
I. Deliberation Day in Colorado
A. Procedures
Sixty-three voting-eligible adults between the ages of 20 and 75 participated; thirty-four
were women and twenty-nine were men. Participants were recruited from two counties in
Colorado for a study on opinions about social and political issues by a professional survey
research firm using random digit dialing. They received $100 for a two-hour session. The
Colorado location was selected purely for logistical convenience. A similar recruitment protocol
could have been followed in any state or geographical area.
4

See the treatment of James Fishkin’s studies, below.
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Half of the sample was drawn from Boulder County, which voted 67% for Democratic
candidate John Kerry in the 2004 presidential election, and the other half from El Paso County
(Colorado Springs), which voted 67% for Republican candidate George Bush. Participants were
also screened to have generally liberal (Boulder) or conservative (Colorado Springs) political
views.5 There were a total of five conservative groups and five liberal groups, with five to seven
members each. In each county, participants came to a central location at a local university for the
study. In the first session, each person completed an individual questionnaire about his or her
personal views on several topics; participants engaged in this task before being informed that
they would be part of a group discussion.
After all participants had completed their individual questionnaires, they were moved to a
different room and told that they would discuss some of the issues as a group. The following
instructions were read aloud by a study administrator:
Next you will meet as a group to discuss some of the topics you just considered in
the survey. As a group, your job will be to try to reach a consensus among you
about each topic. As an individual, your job is to express your personal opinion on
each discussion topic, and to attempt to reach a group consensus through
discussion. You will have 15 minutes per topic.
One member of your group has been randomly selected to be the ‘monitor.’ The
monitor’s job is to (1) read instructions and questions aloud to the group, (2)
make sure the group performs each discussion task in the proper order, (3) set the
timer at 15 minutes for each discussion and (4) record the group’s final consensus
opinion at the end of each discussion.
The monitor will be given 5 numbered envelopes, which should be opened in
numerical order. For instance, the monitor will first open Envelope 1, read the
question and instructions inside to the group, and then set the timer for 15
minutes. At the end of the 15 minutes, the monitor will record the ‘Group
Consensus Opinion’ (if there is consensus), and then open Envelope 2.
Each discussion should last approximately 15 minutes. DO NOT take straw votes
until you are close to the end of your time—use the full 15 minutes.

5

Screening questions included the following. (a) “In general, would you describe your political views as very
conservative, conservative, moderate, liberal, or very liberal?” (b) “Suppose you were in the voting booth and you
came across an office for which two candidates . . . were running and you had never heard of either one. Which
candidate would you choose-- the Democrat or the Republican--or would you just not vote for that office?” Grades
were also assigned to various people on how they would be as president. The conservative names included Dick
Cheney, Wayne Allard (U.S. Senator from Colorado), Rush Limbaugh, Pat Robertson. The liberal names included
Edward Kennedy, Hillary Clinton, Jessie Jackson, and John Kerry.
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IMPORTANT NOTE: Be sure not to close discussion before everyone has had a
chance to talk.
If you understand these instructions, you can open Envelope 1 and begin
discussion on the first topic.”
Participants discussed the three issues as a group and tried to reach consensus in fifteen
minutes of discussion. After discussion, they filled out another questionnaire in which they rerated each issue privately as individuals. All discussions were videotaped.
B. Materials
Each group discussed the same three issues, and every member rated their personal
attitudes before and after discussion on a 1 (Disagree Very Strongly) to 10 (Agree Very
Strongly) scale.
Disagree
Very
Strongly

Disagree
Strongly

Disagree

Disagree
Somewhat

Disagree
Slightly

Agree
Slightly

Agree
Somewhat

Agree

Agree
Strongly

Agree
Very
Strongly

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

The three issues were:
1. The United States should sign an international agreement to reduce the greenhouse
gases produced in this country that contribute to global warming.
2. When different applicants for the same job or educational opportunity are almost equal
on relevant criteria, then the job or admission should be given to members of groups in
society that have been discriminated against in the past.
3. Two adults of the same sex should be able to form a “civil union,” which would entitle
them to certain legal rights such as joint home ownership, or access to the other’s
retirement or medical benefits.
The first questionnaire also included demographic information and some filler items.
C. Results
The recruitment process was successful in assembling groups in Boulder that were, on
average, significantly more liberal than those in Colorado Springs in their initial opinions (Table
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1). When combined across all three issues, individual prediscussion opinions show substantial
differences between the two counties.6
Table 1. Summary of Individual Responses
BOULDER (liberal groups)
mean
mean
moved stayed moved
predeliberation postdeliberation down same
up

% groups
polarized

Global Warming

9.19

9.44

5

18

8

60%

Affirmative Action

5.81

6.38

6

11

15

80%

Civil Unions

9.22

9.69

1

19

12

100%

Overall

8.07

8.50

12

48

35

80%

COLORADO SPRINGS (conservative groups)
mean
mean
moved stayed moved
predeliberation postdeliberation down same
up

% groups
polarized

Global Warming

5.13

2.97

21

7

3

100%

Affirmative Action

2.84

1.61

19

10

2

100%

Civil Unions

2.48

2.19

8

18

5

80%

Overall

3.48

2.26

48

35

10

93%

We now explore the effects of deliberation, separately analyzing the consequences for
individual views and the consequences for group decisions.
1. Individual mean shifts toward extremity. With respect to the views of individuals, the
results showed consistent evidence of ideological amplification. Six groups produced individual
means that shifted in the same direction as the general leaning of the group for all three issues,
and the other four groups did so on two of the three issues. There were a total of thirty group
discussions (ten groups X three issues per group). Overall, then, twenty-six of thirty discussions
(87%) produced ideological amplification in individual judgments. (An analysis of the medians
produced essentially identical results.)
6

A repeated measures ANOVA showed that there were highly significant differences between the two samples
in their predeliberation opinions on the issues to be discussed: F(1,61) = 234.3, p < .001), This difference was
separately significant for each of the three issues (each issue p < .001).
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This pattern of amplification is confirmed in a more formal analysis. For all individuals,
we subtracted prediscussion opinions from postdiscussion opinions on each issue to produce an
attitude shift “difference score.” For the liberal groups, a positive difference would represent
amplification and for the conservative groups it would be a negative difference, which is exactly
what we observe (Table 1). This difference between counties is highly significant, F(1,61) =
56.1, p < .001, and is separately significant for each issue (global warming p < .001, affirmative
action p < .001 and civil unions p < .02). Thus we clearly observe a shift toward more extreme
opinions in groups of both ideologies, but in opposite directions.
There is a small but statistically significant tendency for the conservative groups to shift
their opinions more, after discussion, than do the liberal groups (p < .01). However, it would be a
mistake to pay much attention to this difference. While some groups would undoubtedly shift
more than others, the difference found here is probably an artifact of the fact that on global
warming and civil unions, liberal groups were so extreme at the beginning that there was little
room for them to move after discussion (Table 1).
2. Differentiation: The gap between liberals and conservatives. Liberals and
conservatives have different opinions and beliefs about many social and political issues, and it is
no surprise that they might come our study with differences on the particularly salient and
controversial issues we chose for discussion (see Table 1 and footnote 5 above). What is the
effect of deliberation, by like-minded groups, on those differences? The answer is simple:
Because of the ideological amplification resulting from the group process, the initial gulf
between opinions in the two counties (8.07 for Boulder vs. 3.48 for Colorado Springs, a
difference of 4.59) grew far wider (8.50 for Boulder vs. 2.26 for Colorado Springs, a now much
larger difference of 6.24, p < .001).
3. Reduced internal diversity. Another important question about deliberation is whether
participants will converge or diverge during the process. A common method for measuring
diversity in opinions is by their standard deviation. For our Deliberation Day, the result is clear:
The diversity of opinion within our groups (as measured by the standard deviation of their
ratings on an issue) was markedly lower after deliberation (Figure 1). The standard deviation of
individual opinions in the group was lower after deliberation for twenty-nine of the thirty groupissue combinations, and fell from a median of 1.17 predeliberation to .69 post (z = 4.7, p <.001,
by a sign test). In other words, deliberation promoted intra-group homogeneity.

7

If we look across groups within a county, a similar pattern can be found: the standard
deviation among groups in Boulder declined from .67 to .51, and in Colorado Springs from .85 to
.76. After deliberation, the opinions of even different groups of people from the same place were
more similar—despite not talking with each other. Overall, then, deliberation created more
homogeneity of opinion within a location.

Figure 1. Opinion Diversity Declines After Deliberation

4. Group decisions. What is the relationship between individual views, predeliberation,
and the views of deliberating groups? This question is of independent interest, because much of
the time, what matters is what groups think and do as such, not only what their members think
and do as individuals. The basic answer is that group decisions were more extreme than the mean
or median of predeliberation judgments.
Overall, twenty-five of thirty groups (83%) reached a consensus decision on a numerical
scale response within fifteen minutes—ten of ten on global warming, seven of ten on affirmative
action and eight of ten on civil unions. Among the twenty five group-issue combinations on
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which a consensus was reached, nineteen groups (76%) reached a consensus decision that was
more extreme than the mean predeliberation individual opinion of group members (the same
figure holds for median predeliberation responses).
II. Explanations and Implications
On Deliberation Day, liberals grew more liberal, and conservatives grew more
conservative; within groups, internal diversity was diminished; and the gap between liberals and
conservatives grew. Why did this happen?
A. Conformity, Ideological Amplification, and Group Polarization
1. Polarization in general. When people discuss their beliefs and preferences in groups,
consensus is almost certain to increase. The increase in conformity occurs both because of basic
conformity or herding habits7 and also because when people share information, opinions, and
arguments, adjustments in points of view will occur.8 More strikingly, a typical effect of
discussion is group polarization, by which deliberating groups end up in a more extreme position
in line with their predeliberation tendencies.9 On Deliberation Day, group polarization occurred
in the particular form of ideological amplification. Indeed, we find unmistakable evidence of that
phenomenon in the political domain.
This is a noteworthy finding, because most studies of group polarization do not involve
politics at all. The original experiments involved risk-taking behavior, with a demonstration that
risk-inclined people became still more risk-inclined as a result of deliberation.10 With respect to
business-related decisions, groups seemed to be willing to take risks that their individual
members would avoid.11 Later studies showed that under some conditions the “risky shift” could
7

Solomon Asch, Opinions and Social Pressure, in Readings About the Social Animal 13 (Elliott Aronson ed.)
(New York: W.H. Freeman, 1995); Festinger, 1954; Muzafer Sherif, An Experimental Approach to the Study of
Attitudes, 1 Sociometry 90 (1937). A good outline can be found in Lee Ross and Richard Nisbet, The Person and the
Situation 28-30 (New York: McGraw Hill, 1991).
8
Daniel Gigone and Reid Hastie, Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group Judgment, 121 Psych. Bulletin
149, 161-62 (1997); Reid Hastie, Review Essay: Experimental Evidence of Group Accuracy, in Information
Pooling and Group Decision Making 129, 133–46 (Bernard Grofman & Guillermo Owen eds., 1983) (Greenwich:
JAI Press).
9
See Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition (1985); Cass R. Sunstein, The Law of Group
Polarization, 10 J. Polit Phil 175 (2002).
10
See Stoner, J. A. F. A comparison of individual and group decision involving risk. Unpublished master's
thesis, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1961.
11
Id.
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be a “cautious shift,” as risk-averse people become more averse to risks after they talk with one
another.12 The direction of the “shift” was related to the domain of experience in which the risky
choice was embedded. The principal examples of “cautious shifts” involved the decision whether
to marry and the decision whether to board a plane despite severe abdominal pain, possibly
requiring medical attention.13 In these cases, deliberating groups moved toward caution, as did
the members who composed them.
The best predictor of the direction of the shift turned out to be the predeliberation median.
Where group members were disposed toward risk, a risky shift was observed. Where members
were disposed toward caution, a cautious shift was observed. Hence group polarization refers to
the tendency of deliberating groups to shift in a more extreme position in line with their
predeliberation tendency. Ideological amplification, as we use the term here, is best understood
as a special case of group polarization.
In the behavioral laboratory, group polarization has been found for a remarkably wide
range of questions. Group deliberation produces more pronounced views on the attractiveness of
people shown in slides; it also occurs for obscure factual questions, such as how far Sodom (on
the Dead Sea) is below sea level.14 Even burglars show a shift, in the cautious direction, when
they discuss prospective criminal endeavors.15
In the domain of law, there is considerable evidence of group polarization as well. In
punitive damages cases, for example, deliberating juries appear to polarize, producing awards
that are often higher than those of the median juror before deliberation begins.16 Group
polarization occurs for judgments of guilt and sentencing in criminal cases.17 With respect to
legal questions, panels of appellate judges polarize too; both Republican and Democratic
appointees show stronger ideological tendencies when sitting on panels consisting entirely of
judges appointed by presidents of the same political party.18 There is some evidence of group

12

Moscovici, S., & Zavalloni, M. (1969). The group as a polarizer of attitudes. Journal of Personality and
Social Psychology 12, 125-135
13
See id.
14 Id.
15
Paul Cromwell et al., Group effects on decision-making by burglars, 69 Psychological Reports 579, 586
(1991).
16
See David Schkade et al., Deliberating About Dollars: The Severity Shift, 100 Colum L Rev 1139 (2000).
17
Kaplan, Martin F. Group-induced polarization in simulated juries. Personality and Social Psychology
Bulletin. Vol 2(1) Winter 1976, 63-66.; Kaplan, Martin F. Discussion polarization effects in a modified jury decision
paradigm: Informational influences. Social Psychology Quarterly. Vol 40(3) Sep 1977, 262-271.
18
See Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, Lisa Ellman, and Andres Sawicki, Are Judges Political? An Empirical
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polarization in issues that bear directly on politics. As a result of deliberation, French people
become more distrustful of the United States and its intentions with respect to foreign aid.19 So
too, feminism can become more attractive to women after internal discussions.20 White people
who are not inclined to show racial prejudice show less prejudice after deliberation than before;
but white people who are inclined to show such prejudice show more prejudice after
deliberation.21
2. Sorting versus mixing. On our Deliberation Day, people were sorted into like-minded
groups, and geography greatly simplified this sorting. Such sorting was a central part of our
design, because we were interested in the effects of deliberations within and across like-minded
groups. But it is natural to ask what would have happened if there had been a degree of mixing—
if people from Colorado Springs had participated in groups with people from Boulder. Existing
work suggests two possible outcomes. First, and most likely, the predeliberation median would
have been predictive here as well.22 Suppose, for example, that a group of five people tended to
oppose civil unions for same-sex couples, because four members sharply opposed them and two
members were mildly in favor of them. In that event, the group would probably move in the
direction of greater opposition, notwithstanding a degree of internal heterogeneity. What matters
is the predeliberation median, not the existence or extent of such heterogeneity.23 Note in this
regard that many of our groups began with some antecedent heterogeneity, and they nonetheless
moved in the way predicted by previous group polarization research.
The second possibility is that positions will be entrenched, with group members showing
a reluctance to listen to those with identifiably competing position. Polarization may not be
found when the relevant group consists of individuals drawn equally from two extremes,24 and
“familiar and long-debated issues do not depolarize easily.”25 Recall that ideological
amplification occurs on the federal judiciary—but on the issues of capital punishment and
Investigation of the Federal Judiciary (2006); Cass R. Sunstein, David Schkade, and Lisa Ellman, Ideological Voting
on Federal Courts of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 Va L Rev 301 (2004).
19
Roger Brown, Social Psychology: The Second Edition 224 (New York: The Free Press, 1985).
20 Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 Psychol. Rev. 687, 689,
691–93 (1996).
21
See id.
22
See Brown, supra note.
23
See Schakde et al., supra note (finding that the predeliberation median predicts movements, even when there
is considerable internal diversity).
24
See H. Burnstein, Persuasion As Argument Processing, in Group Decision Making (H. Brandstetter, J.H.
Davis, and G. Stocker-Kreichgauer eds., 1982).
25
Brown, supra, at 226.
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abortion, Republican appointees are not affected by sitting with two Democratic appointees, and
Democratic appointees are impervious to the influences of two Republican appointees.26 Within
deliberating groups, entrenchment is more likely if group membership is specifically announced
or otherwise made salient. For most political issues, on which people do not have rigidly
determined positions, social influences and hence polarization are more typical.
B. Explaining Polarization—and Its Limits
Why does group polarization occur? There are several reasons.27 The first and perhaps
most important involves informational influences. It is both fortunate and true that most people
are willing to listen to both the conclusions and the arguments offered by other people. In any
group with some initial inclination, the views of most people in the group will inevitably be
skewed in the direction of that inclination. Suppose, for example, that most people in a group
believe that civil unions for same-sex couples are a bad idea. As a statistical matter, the
arguments favoring that initial position will be more numerous than the arguments pointing in
the other direction. Individuals will have heard of some, but not all, of the arguments that emerge
from group deliberation. As a result of hearing the various arguments, deliberation will lead
people toward a more extreme point in line with what group members initially believed. Through
this process, many minds can polarize, and in exactly the same direction. Informational
influences had an evident influence on Deliberation Day in Colorado.
The second explanation involves social influences.28 Sometimes people’s publicly stated
views are, to a greater or lesser extent, a function of how they want to present themselves. People
usually want to be perceived favorably by other group members. Once they hear what others
believe, some will adjust their positions at least slightly in the direction of the dominant position,
to present themselves in the way that they prefer. In a liberal group, for example, movements in
the liberal direction will be favored and, for this reason, all members might end up leaning
somewhat more to the left. This explanation fits well with the changes that we observed.
The third explanation stresses the close links between confidence, extremism, and
corroboration by others.29 If people lack confidence, they will tend toward the middle, and hence
26

See Sunstein et al., supra note.
27 See Brown, supra note, at 212–22, 226–45; Robert Baron et al., Social Corroboration and Opinion
Extremity, 32 J Experimental Soc. Psych. 537 (1996)..
28
See id.
29 See Baron et al., at 557–59 (showing that corroboration increases confidence and hence extremism).
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avoid the extremes. As people gain confidence, they usually are willing to become more extreme
in their beliefs. Agreement from others tends to increase confidence, and in this way like-minded
people, having deliberated with one another, become more sure that they are right and thus more
extreme. In a wide variety of experimental contexts, people’s opinions have been shown to
become more extreme simply because their views have been corroborated, and because they
have become more confident after learning that others share their views.30
A great deal of work suggests that group polarization is heightened when people have a
sense of shared identity, and this point helps to suggest yet another explanation of polarization.31
People may polarize because they are attempting to conform to the position that they see as
typical within their own group. If their group’s identity is especially salient or important, the ingroup norms “are likely to become more extreme so as to be more clearly differentiated from
outgroup norms, and the within-group polarization will be enhanced.”32 When Democrats or
Republicans become polarized, the desire to ensure intergroup differentiation is likely to be a
motive. In our own experiment, involving global warming, affirmative action, and civil unions,
many groups were all the more prone to polarization when their internal discussions referred to
some group with whom they disagreed, such as “the liberals.”
Thus, there are at least four social-cognitive processes that feed into the intensification
and extremification of beliefs that make up the polarization effect: informational pressure,
conformity effects, social confidence, and group membership identification. An understanding of
these processes suggest the circumstances in which polarization might not occur on Deliberative
Day. In particular, interventions that involve external administrators, or independent flows of
information, might produce different kinds of shifts.
In highly influential work, for example, James Fishkin has pioneered the idea of a
“deliberative opinion poll,” in which small groups, consisting of highly diverse individuals, are
asked to come together and to deliberate about various issues.33 Deliberative opinion polls have
now been conducted in several nations, including the United States, England, and Australia.
Fishkin finds some noteworthy shifts in individual views; but he does not find a systematic
tendency toward polarization. In his studies, individuals shift both toward and away from the

30 Id. at 541, 546–47, 557 (concluding that corroboration of one’s views has effects on opinion extremity).
31 See Brown, at 209–11; Turner, at 159–70; Joel Cooper et al., at 259, 269–70.
32 Brown, supra note, at 210.
33
See James S. Fiskin, The Voice of the People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995).
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median of predeliberation views. In England, for example, deliberation led to reduced interest in
using imprisonment as a tool for combating crime.34 The percentage believing that “sending
more offenders to prison” is an effective way to prevent crime went down from 57% to 38%; the
percentage believing that fewer people should be sent to prison increased from 29% to 44%;
belief in the effectiveness of “stiffer sentences” was reduced from 78% to 65%.35 Similar shifts
were shown in the direction of greater enthusiasm for procedural rights of defendants and
increased willingness to explore alternatives to prison. In other experiments with the deliberative
opinion poll, shifts included a mixture of findings, with larger percentages of individuals
concluding that legal pressures should be increased on fathers for child support (from 70% to
85%) and that welfare and health care should be turned over to the states (from 56% to 66%).36
On some issues, the effect of deliberation was to create an increase in the intensity with
which people held their preexisting convictions.37 These findings, a form of ideological
amplification, are consistent with the prediction of group polarization. But in deliberative
opinion polls, this was hardly a uniform pattern. On some questions, deliberation increased the
percentage of people holding a minority position (with, for example, a jump from 36% to 57% of
people favoring policies making divorce “harder to get”).38 These are not the changes that would
be predicted by group polarization.
At least two factors distinguish the deliberative opinion poll from our Deliberation Day.
First, Fishkin’s groups were overseen by a moderator, concerned to ensure a level of openness
and likely to alter some of the dynamics discussed here. Second, and probably more important,
Fishkin’s studies presented participants with a set of written materials that attempted to be
balanced and that contained detailed arguments supporting sides. The likely consequence would
be to move people in different directions from those that would be expected by simple group
discussion, unaffected by external materials inevitably containing a degree of authority.
It is difficult to know, in advance and in the abstract, how any particular group will
34

Id. at 206-07.
Id.
36
Fishkin and Luskin, supra note, at 23.
37
See id. at 22-23 (showing a jump, on a scale of 1 to 4, from 3.51 to 3.58 in intensity of commitment to
reducing the deficit); a jump, on a scale of 1 to 3, from 2.71 to 2.85 in intensity of support for greater spending on
education; showing a jump, on a scale of 1 to 3, from 1.95 to 2.16, in commitment to aiding American business
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respond to any particular set of materials, even one that attempts to be balanced. And it would be
valuable to attempt to conduct deliberative opinion polls with testable hypotheses—suggesting,
for example, that deliberating groups might reach the right answer on questions that have
answers that can be shown to be right. Our only suggestion here is that on political issues, the
likely result for deliberating groups, unaccompanied by an external moderator or a set of
independent arguments, is amplification of preexisting views.
C. Implications
Does ideological amplification lead to accurate or inaccurate answers? Do deliberating
groups err when they polarize? No general answer would make sense. Everything depends on the
relationship between the correct answer and the group’s predeliberation tendencies. If the group
is leaning toward the right answer, polarization might lead them directly to the truth. But there
are no guarantees here. When individuals are leaning in a direction that is mistaken, the mistake
will be amplified by group deliberation.
Consider some results from domains in which mistakes and biases can be identified
without taking a controversial stand on normative issues. When most people are prone to make
conjunction errors (believing that A and B are more likely together than A or B alone), group
processes lead to more errors, not fewer.39 With respect to questions with correct answers,
deliberating groups tend to do about as well as or slightly better than their average member—but
not as well as their best members, and they do not reliably answer correctly.40 Group polarization
occurs when jury members are biased as a result of pretrial publicity; the jury as a group
becomes more biased than individual jurors were.41 This is polarization in action, and it produces
large blunders. Hence it is possible to show that in many domains, the consequence of

39 Norbert L. Kerr et al., Bias in Judgment: Comparing Individuals and Groups, 103 Psychol. Rev. 687, 692
(1996).
40 See Daniel Gigone and Reid Hastie Proper Analysis of the Accuracy of Group Judgment, 121 Psych.
Buletin 149, 161-62 (1997) (summarizing findings that groups do not perform as well as best members); Reid
Hastie, Review Essay: Experimental Evidence of Group Accuracy, in Information Pooling and Group Decision
Making 129, 133–46 (Bernard Grofman & Guillermo Owen eds., 1983) (Greenwich: JAI Press). To the same effect,
see Garold Stasser & Beth Dietz-Uhler, Collective Choice, Judgment, and Problem Solving, in Blackwell Handbook
of Group Psychology: Group Processes 31, 49–50 (Michael A. Hogg & R. Scott Tindale eds., Oxford: Blackwell
Publishing, 2001) (collecting findings).
41 Robert J. MacCoun, Comparing Micro and Macro Rationality, in Judgments, Decisions, and Public Policy
116, 127-28 (Rajeev Gowda & Jeffrey C. Fox eds., Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002).
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deliberation is to perpetuate and even to amplify individual mistakes.42 When individuals show a
high degree of bias, groups are likely to be more biased, not less biased, than their median or
average member.43
We do not contend that every Deliberation Day will have the same results as Deliberation
Day in Colorado. But in any nation that shows political segregation along geographic lines,
similar outcomes should be expected. It is plausible to suggest that some nations, including the
United States, operate to some extent as a collection of special interest enclaves44 in which
people are especially likely to associate and deliberate with others who agree with them. To the
extent that migration patterns produce more homogeneous subcultures, routine exposure to
diverse opinions may become less likely. Similar results might be produced by the rise of highly
specialized sources of information, above all the Internet, which make it increasingly easy for
people to avoid opinions that differ from theirs.45 Indeed, there is a well-documented tendency
for people to seek information that confirms their existing beliefs and to avoid or devalue
disconfirming information (“confirmation bias”).46 The ease of finding confirmatory evidence is
likely to accelerate the balkanization of opinion.
As Fishkin’s studies suggest, it should be possible to structure deliberation in such a way
as to diminish the likelihood of polarization; neutral arbiters, providing information and helping
to manage discussion, might have a substantial effect.47 Various efforts to “prime” participants
might influence the effects of deliberation. If participants are reminded of the attacks on 9/11, or
of events that cast a favorable or unfavorable light on certain positions or even officials, they
might be affected, perhaps in a way that will diminish the effects found here. But whatever the
effects of such priming, Deliberation Day in Colorado offers important cautionary notes about
the consequences of deliberation on political judgments.

42

William P. Bottom et al., Propagation of Individual Bias Through Group Judgment: Error in the Treatment of
Asymmetrically Informative Signals, 25 J. Risk & Uncertainty 147, 152–54 (2002).
43
See MacCoun, supra note.
44
Abramowitz AI, Alexander B, Gunning M Incumbency, redistricting, and the decline of competition in US
House elections JOURNAL OF POLITICS 68 (1): 75-88 FEB 2006
45
See Cass R. Sunstein, Republic.com (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000), for discussion.
46
See Nickerson, R.S. (1998). Confirmation bias: A ubiquitous phenomenon in many guises. Review of
General Psychology, 2, 175-220.
47
See James Fishkin, The Voice of the People (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990).
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III. Conclusion
On Deliberation Day, liberals became more liberal and conservatives became more
conservative. On the large issues of the day, discussions by like-minded people fueled greater
extremism, and also increased divisions between liberals and conservatives. At the same time,
both liberal and conservative groups became more homogenous; deliberation reduced internal
diversity. There is every reason to believe that results of this kind occur not simply in
experimental settings, but in many domains in which citizens engage in political discussions with
one another. Those who seek to foster broader deliberation, or to celebrate deliberative
conceptions of democracy, might do well to keep these points in view.

Readers with comments should address them to:
Professor Cass R. Sunstein
University of Chicago Law School
1111 East 60th Street
Chicago, IL 60637
csunstei@uchicago.edu
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